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The paper comments on a rather uncommon approach to mathematics called 
physicalist formalism, according to which formal systems are genuine physical 
systems. A brief review of the main theses is given, then arguments are worked 
out, concerning mostly with the practice of mathematics and the uniqueness of 
formal systems, aiming to show the implausibility of this radical view.
On the following pages I comment on a rather uncommon philosophical approach to 
mathematics called physicalist formalism.i I give a brief review of the main theses, then 
I try to outline some of the main flaws of this approach. I am far from the intent to be  
exhaustive  in  this  respect,  as  I  am far  from a consequent  defence of an  alternative 
approach. But I am convinced that the few arguments given here, concerning mostly 
with the practice of mathematics and the uniqueness of formal systems, are enough to 
i  See the works of Szabó L. E. (2003), (2009), (2010). The third one being a lecture note, I will quote 
the first two whereas it is possible.
1
show the implausibility of this radical view.
Mathematical assertions have no meaning
The formalist-physicalist philosophy of mathematics lies on the empiricist extreme of 
the “ideologies” concerning mathematics. As a genuine empiricist view, it has its own 
questions and problems to cope with by its own way. As Ayer put it in this often recited  
paragraph:
For whereas a scientific generalization is  readily admitted to be fallible,  the 
truths of mathematics and logic appear to everyone to be necessary and certain.  
But if empiricism is correct no proposition which has a factual content can be 
necessary or certain. Accordingly the empiricist  must deal with the truths of 
logic and mathematics in one of the following ways: he must say either that  
they are not necessary truths, in which case he must account for the universal 
conviction that they are; or he must say that they have no factual content, and 
then he must explain how a proposition which is empty of all factual content 
can be true and useful and surprising. [...]  If neither of these courses proves 
satisfactory, we shall be obliged to give way to rationalism. We shall be obliged 
to  admit  that  there  are  some  truths  about  the  world  which  we  can  know 
independently of experience.ii
Physicalism, as it is outlined in Szabó’s works, has to deal with both kinds of 
challenge. On one hand, mathematics is said to be an inductive science, so it cries for 
explanation why its truths (in a pre-theoretic sense) are usually thought to be necessary 
or its “laws” to be more solid than that of physics.iii On the other hand, physicalism 
ii  Ayer (1936), pp. 72-73.
iii  Once I talked about Russell’s thought experiment (in Russell (1912)) to one of my friends, an 
immaculate in philosophy. “Can you imagine that there are immortal humans?” – I asked. “Yes, of 
course I can” – he said. “But can you imagine that 2x2 is 5?” After a while he replied: “Yes, I can, but 
it makes me rather angry” – indeed, in a more informal way can not be literally cited here.
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asserts  that  mathematical  statements  do  have  factual  content,  though far  not  in  the 
usually preached sense. So the urge for the explanation of useful and surprising result 
also remains. Szabó is up to accomplishing both of these tasks, but, I will argue, the 
results are unsatisfactory.
According to the physicalist-formalist a mathematical statement (a theorem) is 
true if and only if it can be derived from the given axiom. The truth condition of a  
statement  lies  in  the  existence  if  its  derivability.  It  is  meaningless  to  talk  about 
mathematical  truth  generally,  only in  accordance  with a  given axiom system. True, 
there  have  not  always  been  reliable  axiom  systems,  but  that  is  only  a  contingent 
historical fact, and as such, lies out of mathematics. Many proofs worked out by the  
mathematicians of the past  are of historical interest  only, and not regarded as strict,  
genuine proofs today.
Szabó (2003) distinguishes two different senses of truth. The first kind is the 
truth of the theorems, i.e. the mathematical truth in a given formal system. The second 
kind of truth is the empirical truth, where a sentence refers to some empirical fact by  
some semantics. Now the main formalist thesis of the physicalist is this: mathematical 
objects  and propositions have no meaning,  they are  only meaningless marks on the 
paper manipulated by some rules. Formulas do not carry Tarskian truth, they can be true 
in the first sense of truth only. The argument says that if a mathematical proposition 
were a statement of the factual world, the mathematician should carry out experiments 
as the physicist does. That is clearly not the case (especially if thought experiment is 
regarded as a special kind of non-experiment).iv Moreover, even if one does associate 
meaning to mathematical propositions it is irrelevant to the truth of the given statement. 
Even if one assumes truth of the second type to the axioms of some formal system, it is  
not granted that it will be come down to the theorems derived from the axiom. In other 
words, whether a theorem derived from semantically true axioms is semantically true or 
not is a contingent fact of the world (would there be semantically true axioms at all).  
iv  There is a bit of muddle here, however. Following the physicalist, as we will see, one would wonder 
what non-physicalist methods mathematicians could have. 
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Maybe there  are mathematical intuitions of which we have perceptions the same way 
we have  perceptions  of  the  physical  world,v but  the  truth  mathematical  statements 
concern with is independent of both. Note, that this account is not simply a rewording of 
the old thesis: all mathematical statements are tautologies, i.e. analytical truths. As we 
will see in a moment, we can not have analytical knowledge – simply because we can 
not have a priori knowledge whatsoever.
The success of mathematics in sciences (paradigmatically, in physics) is often 
considered as a strong argument for that it does embrace some crucial structures in the 
“real world”. Moreover (as the so called Quine-Putnam-argument holds), mathematics 
is indispensible in physics, and we have to have ontological commitments toward the 
indispensible.  Szabó claims that  this  argumentation can be  easily  undermined. First, 
mathematics  has  much  more  than  what  is  needed  in  physics.  Second,  reliable 
predictions are not made by mathematics itself, but by a complex physical theory with 
its semantics (of course, mathematical statements do not carry Tarskian truth). Third, 
there are more than one mathematical theories applicable in, say, physical predictions, 
and, forth, the appropriate mathematical theory is chosen by the physicists, not by some 
external constraints.
Since  mathematical  theories  (in  themselves)  are  nothing  more  than  formal 
systems,  it  is  meaningless  to  talk  about  intended  interpretations,  standard  models, 
intuitive arithmetic or set theory and so on. True, however, says the physicalist, that the 
axiom systems may not be entirely arbitrary: usefulness can be a criterion for choosing 
them. Anyhow, systems taken as “formal”vi, and among them the ones with interest for 
mathematicians are chosen along convention or usefulness – factors lying outside of 
v  As Gödel puts it in his defence of platonism: “[T]here is nothing in the least absurd in the existence of 
totalities containing members, which can be described (i.e., uniquely characterized) only by reference 
to this totality. [...] Classes and concepts may [...] be conceived as real objects [...] existing 
independently of us and our definitions and constructions. It seems to me that the assumption of such 
objects is quite as legitimate as the assumption of physical bodies and there is quite as much reason to 
believe in their existence.” Gödel (1944), p. 456.
vi  According to Szabó it is mere convention that the rules and “symbols” of chess are not regarded as an 
axiomatic system.
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mathematics.  I  am  not  sure  how  conventional  and  useful  Peano-arithmetic  is,  but 
seemingly the physicalist does not take great pains to explain why some formal systems 
are interesting for mathematicians, why not others. 
There are no structures to be represented
After  the  semantic apologetics  for  formalism,  Szabó  turns  to  the  main  genuine 
physicalist  theses  as  the  results  of  some  ontological considerations.  Though 
mathematical  propositions  have  no  meaning,  they  express  objective  facts  about  the 
formal  systems  they  stem  from.  To  be  more  precise:  they  express  facts  about  the 
particular signs constituting the given system and the rules by which they are combined. 
Rules are also laid down by signs. The ontology of formal systems is thus so simple:  
there are only object as participants in (contingent) physical facts.
The “physicality” of formal systems has two sides. First, the only way for one to  
be informed of the truth of some mathematical fact is through a physical process. Of 
course, physical processes are required for one to be “informed” of anything – let them 
be  historical  speculations,  artistic  impressions  or  astrological  constellations.  Doing 
mathematics  in  the  head or  divine  revelations are  not  exceptions – in  a  physicalist  
account there is always an underlying neurophysiologic process. Now, the knowledge of 
the truth of some mathematical proposition is a truth-condition of the given proposition. 
It  would be good to  know how about  other  propositions?  I  mean,  according to  the 
physicalist, is the knowledge of the truth of the sentence
It was a wild and stormy night on the West Coast of Scotlandvii
a truth-conditions for it? If not, what the special status of mathematical statements lies 
in?
vii    “[…] This, however, is immaterial to the present story, as the scene is not laid in the West of 
Scotland. For the matter of that the weather was just as bad on the East coast of Ireland.” Leacock 
(1911), p. 45.
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Second,  mathematical  propositions (the  true ones,  i.e.  which can be  derived) 
express objective facts of the physical world of the system. Thus, says Szabó with irony, 
we do have the ontological commitment the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument 
claims for: mathematical statements “talk” about formal systems, i.e. strings of symbols, 
and we do believe in the existence of these entities. 
It must be clear that the formal systems so understood are particular, concrete 
systems. There are no abstract things, abstract structures represented by them. It would 
be a categorical mistake to assume various “isomorphisms”. Mathematical knowledge is 
not conventional (though choosing the particular topic (i.e. system) is), not perfect, not a 
priori, not certain. Mathematical truths reveal “contingent facts about a particular part of 
the physical world”.viii 
Probably the most striking assertion of the physicalist is that there is no certain 
knowledge gained through deduction, since the latter is only a special case of induction 
–  namely  the  one  dealing  with  the  facts  of  formal-physical  systems.  This  claim is 
uncommon though,  it  follows from what  is  said  so  far.  If  the  truth-condition  for  a 
mathematical proposition is nothing more than knowledge of the given propositions, 
then there is no difference between knowledge and truth in this case. Formal systems 
are particular physical systems of which we can gain information by observations – thus 
induction.
True,  mathematical  truths  appear  necessary  and certain truths  for many.  The 
reason is that formal systems usually have stable behaviour among the physical systems 
and do not require  “external”  observations.  But  since “observations” and “(thought)
experiments”  provide  the  only  way to  get  in  possession  of  mathematical  truths  the 
certainty  so  gained  is  exactly  the  certainty  of   physical  truths.  According  to  the 
physicalist’s consolation, the “certainty available in inductive generalisation is the best 
of all certainties”.ix 
viii Szabó (2009), p. 9.
ix  Szabó (2003), p. 10.
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Scientific practice does not belong to mathematics
One of the main morals of the physicalist approach is, I think, that mathematics is not 
what we usually mean talking about “mathematics”, be the concept however vague. Of 
course, rational reconstructions often require the revision of commonly used concepts 
for  the  sake  of  exactness.  But  I  regard  such  a  radical  change  in  the  concept  of 
mathematics unjustified. Moreover, my taste draws me to approaches with more bias 
toward scientific practice: as philosophical concerns can be of crucial importance for the 
science, philosophy likewise should not be blind for the actual scientific practice. 
True, Szabó does mention the practice of mathematics:
Of  course,  very  much  depends  on  how  we  understand  the  practice  of  the 
mathematician. I think, that in the same way like ordinary people who dream 
about movie stars but live with their partner, mathematicians rave about various 
platonic objects, but if they are seriously asked what they are confident about,  
they reduce their claims to mere if-thenisms. All the rest is just “folklore”. And 
this holds not only for the more complex branches of mathematics but also for  
arithmetic and set theory. When the number theorist says “there are infinitely 
many prime numbers”, or simply ‘7 is a prime number lager than 5’ then (s)he 
means that  all  these  concepts  as ‘larger’  and ‘prime’,  etc.,  are  defined with 
formal  rigor,  and  that  the  statement  in  question  is  a  theorem  within  the 
corresponding formal framework. This is true even if (s)he proves it by simple 
calculations,  since  it  was previously  proved that  the  employed algorithm is 
correct.  [...]  Thus,  concerning  the  rigorous,  scientifically  justified,  non-
folkloristic part of the claims of mathematicians, it is far from “unquestionable” 
that they are committed to something more than if-thenism.x
I suppose, I understand scientific practice in a different way. When a mathematician is 
x  Szabó (2010), p. 21.
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working on a given problem always uses a language somewhat similar to the ordinary 
one, and, of course uses the  tool of formal derivation in the given formal system. But 
the latter alone, isolated from the sloppy words and thoughts would hardly “work” as 
mathematics,  we  would  have  only  ink-marks  on  a  piece  of  paper,  exactly  as  the 
formalist insists. (I will address this point below.) Maybe mathematicians are “Sunday-
formalists”,xi but they do their work on weekdays. Undeniably, formal methods are of 
extreme importance for them, but other things have role in their scientific practice as 
well. Even when working with their pencil and paper, mathematician quite rarely do 
something like deriving proposition from a bulk of axioms.
I do not intend to inquire into what is in the mathematician’s head. Assessing 
what she believes in, what she is committed to is not an easy mission. A much more 
modest project is just to regard what she does when doing mathematics. I am convinced 
that a philosopher dealing with mathematics should always keep one eye on this.
Historical, psychological curiosities do not belong to mathematics
It  is  easy  to  agree  with  this  consequence.  However,  glancing at  mathematics  from 
historical or psychological perspective could have some morals for the philosopher. 
It  is  obvious  that  strict,  formal,  axiomatic  systems,  the  only  instances  of 
mathematics according to the physicalist,  have not always existed.  Indeed, they had 
only been brought about in the wake of the foundation projects in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century.xii Even not drawing far-reaching conclusions from this 
fact, the physicalist must realize that the (only) objects there are for mathematics (in his 
view) can not be independent of human activity. Of course, he can say, human activity  
was indispensable for exhibiting some other systems in physics: (at least) instruments 
were needed to  detect  them.  Now it  would be  of  interest  to  show that  the  activity  
xi  A label coined by Reuben Hersh: (contemporary) mathematicians, when asked of the nature of 
mathematics usually incline toward a formalist explanation while in their practice they work with their 
objects as “real” objects.
xii  Of course, their origins can be traced down in the works of Leibniz or even Euclid. 
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resulting in the exhibition of formal systems is by no means different from those giving 
us the possibility to talk about protons, neutrons and electrons, for instance. Or if it  is 
different, showing its specific nature may have some morals.xiii But the task does not 
seem to me trivial at all.
Moreover,  historical  consideration  can  shed  some  light  on  how  does 
mathematics (in the usual sense of the word) really work. One can consult, for instance, 
the physicalist's only explanation for the existence of the actual mathematical objects: 
the alleged utilitarian factors behind the fact that some privileged systems are in the 
spotlight  and not the infinitely many possible others – those only useful in physical 
theories. In the light of history, this assertion does not seem to be wholly convincing. 
True, there are theories whose births were inevitably urged by practical problems, e.g. 
analysis. But most of the theories are rather like non-Euclidean geometries: there were 
no practical constraints whatsoever as midwives at their births. And there is a bulk of 
mathematical theories whose practical applications are far from clear.
As for psychology, it exhibits time and again various patterns of pre-theoretic 
mathematical  ability  in  adults,  children  or  animals  by  strict,  behaviouristic  means. 
Again, without going too far with the consequences, this could at least suggest that the 
actual systems dealt with in mathematical practice are not entirely arbitrary. 
  I will not go into details  here along the lines sketched above. My intent was 
only to indicate that the position of the physicalist can be  weakened by historical or 
psychological considerations (too). True, one can disregard these perspectives and put 
normative claims on mathematics. I will address this point soon. But let us  stay with 
mathematical practice for a little more while now.
xiii Since the physicalist regards formal systems as flesh and blood object, it seems to me he must accept 
that they are simply manmade – at least all of the symbols used for mathematics are such. Hence 
maybe some “epistemology of artefacts” should be applied on them and methods akin to car testing or 
literary criticism…
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Intuitions, heuristic do not belong to mathematics
It  is a well known fact that mathematical results reach far beyond human intuitions. 
Some say, there was a point somewhere around the birth of non-Euclidean geometries, 
when intuitions and modern mathematics divorced inevitably and for good and all. The 
situation is far not so black and white, however.
First,  intuitive insight and “intended interpretations” can be blamed for those 
structures (axiomatic systems, if you like) that we regard as mathematics today, even if 
they had grown over human intuitions. It is not unthinkable that the physicalist would 
be ready to admit this point, only he would add as usual: this is a contingent “historical”  
fact. 
Second, much depends on what we mean by intuition. We can insist that it is 
something  like  an  eternal,  unchangeable,  mental  vista  which  covers  some  areas  of 
mathematics but not others. But we can be more permissive. If we let the concept to  
encompass any kind of, say, intuition-like heuristics, then we can confidently assert that 
intuition  can  be  trained.  In  this  case  practising mathematicians  have  much  more 
intuition concerning complex structures than other earthborn beings. 
Szabó  (2010)  declares  that  his  physicalist  account  of  mathematics  concerns 
strictly the context of verification, not heuristics. In his opinion, creativity, intuition, 
and, what is more, human thought as such plays only a marginal role in the verification 
of mathematical propositions, for, essentially, proofs are nothing more than serials of 
formulas derived mechanically from the axioms. And these derivations often run far 
beyond the intuitive insight of a human. Nowadays, says Szabó, one can not claim a  
proof to be surveyable, as it is clearly seen in the rather complex computer-based proof 
of the four-colour theorem, for instance.xiv 
First,  it is worth to note in connection with the four-colour theorem, that the 
computer-based part of  its  proof is far  not so complex. The thing is,  that  there are 
simply  too  many  cases of  given  (graph-theoretical)  constellation-type  for  a  human 
xiv See: Appel, Haken, Koch (1977) and Tymoczko (1979).
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mathematician to check even along a lifetime. Yes, this part of the proof is mechanical, 
but not in the sense the physicalist would like to see. The (computerized, mathematical) 
system does not check what follows from the axioms of first-order logic along with the 
axioms of set  theory and the definitions of graph theory,  but it  simply executes the 
algorithmic rules specified by the programmer (mathematician). The “rest” of the proof 
does  require  creativity  and  human  thinking  (including  programming).  And  not 
necessarily in a weak sense: without them there would be no theorem whatsoever, (so 
there would be nothing to declare as a mere physical fact, as a mere consequence of 
some physical system).
On the other hand, some contemporary proofs like Wiles’ on Fermat-conjecture
xv are surveyable. True, maybe it is not surveyable for me, but it is for the professionals 
of  the  topic  –  or  topics:  the  proof  exploits  numerous  highly  esoteric  mathematical 
results.  Anyway,  I  think  that  surveyability  is  a  rather  vague  and,  in  addition, 
unimportant concept. The crucial thing lies elsewhere. It is hard to defend the claim, 
that a proof like  the one by Wiles is nothing more than a mere mechanical derivation 
from the  axioms.  Indeed,  it  would be  hard  to  model such  a  proof  as  a  mechanical 
process. For one to build a computer program deriving the proof of Fermat-conjecture 
(say, in the style of Wiles), it seems to me, he must already know and understand the  
ideas applied in the proof given by Wiles! 
Note, that according to Szabó (2009) the “mechanism” of a formal system can be 
observed as a neuro-physical process of the brain as well.  (Well,  in a  more correct 
wording: the serial of neurophysical processes in a brain accomplishing derivations is to 
be regarded as a genuine formal system.) Note further, that we can not, certainly, talk 
about “representation” of a system, of a proof or something like that, because there is  
nothing to represent. There are only particular physical objects (and “physical” rules) 
remained  for  us  as  mathematics,  ink-coloured  paper  pulp,  conducting  wires,  firing 
xv  Wiles (1995).
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neurons.xvi But  as  far  as  I  know we are  quite  far  from the  understanding of  brain 
processes, quite far from more or less justly regarding human brain as a Turing-machine 
(even though it is often regarded so despite of this fact), and very far from identifying 
the neurophysical process of adding five to seven. Though I understand that the formal 
systems  thus  revealed  are  of  crucial  importance  for  the  physicalist,  this  area  is  so 
slippery that I think it is better to keep or attention on ink, paper and machines. 
As  far  as  I  can  see,  the  only  plausible  understanding  of  formal  systems  as 
physical phenomena is the following. Assume a Turing-machine with the axioms of 
logic,  arithmetic,  derivations  rules  etc.  programmed  in  it.xvii Then  maybe  we  can 
venture, that the machine will derive the proof of the Fermat-conjecture at some point, 
we only have to wait long enough, since it will derive all of the theorems of the system 
if we wait infinitely long. Give a monkey a typewriter and infinite time, it will sooner or 
later put down the complete works of Shakespeare.xviii So far so good, but what can we 
do with that fact? Can mathematics build on this result,  and the infinite many other 
results so derived? Can they be grabbed, picked up or isolated?xix (And by whom?)
Sure,  one  can  construct  an  arbitrary axiom  system,  since  the  adherence  of 
mathematicians to the ones in use is another “contingent and unimportant” fact. Sure, 
she can translate it into algorithms to check the mechanical consequences by a Turing-
machine. Sure, she will get arbitrarily long proofs/theorems (during an arbitrarily long 
time), which happen to be quite unsurveyable in every respect. But it seems also sure  
for  me:  maybe  they  can  be  seen  as  a  genuine  part  of  mathematics  from  some 
xvi Since these are the only things out there, they can not be regarded as tokens, not having types. I will 
address this rather problematical point in a moment.
xvii But notice that going only that far is not at all unproblematic: at this point we have already much 
more than the mere axioms at play.
xviii Will it really, is another question. Could every finite sequence of formulas be enumerated, the 
monkey will die, the typewriter will go wrong in a (rather short) finite time. Of course, these are only 
“contingent facts of physics”…




philosophical reconstruction, but they will be completely unimportant for and will have 
nothing to do with mathematics as a science. Mathematics as practice has also nothing 
to do with the bigger part of mathematics as so-labelled by the physicalist.
Gödel-theorems  and  in  general  meta-mathematical  activities  do  not  belong  to  
mathematics
Following  Hilbert,  the  physicalist  draws  clear  distinction  between  mathematics 
consisting of systems (somehow) built up by meaningless sign and activities dealing 
with these  systems,  namely meta-mathematics.  The latter  can make real  meaningful 
statements about the formal systems (i.e. mathematics), which can be true (or false) in 
the semantic sense. In fact, meta-mathematical results are physical theories on physical 
formal systems expressed in some genuine language – even though this language (or 
better:  a part  of it) highly resembles to  the (meaningless)  sign serials  of the formal 
systems.  It  follows  from  this  that  the  theorems  of  mathematical  logic  are  to  be 
confirmed by empirical means: by observations.
But  what  is  the  empirical  content  of  Gödel-theorems,  Löwenheim-Skolem-
theorems,  the  theorem on the  independence  of  continuum hypothesis  etc.?  Do they 
really assert a feature of a  particular physical system? (Which one?) Maybe even the 
physicalist does not intend to claim that there is only one particular system the above 
theorems go for. On the other hand, it is quite implausible to say, that the confirmation 
goes like this: we pull out similar systems from a hat, one after other and check whether 
the given theorem holds in it or not. It is far from clear what feature of this meaningless 
serials of signs is asserted by the upper Löwenheim-Skolem-theorem, say. And it is far  
from clear how similarity is to be understood: my handwriting, a PC with an algorithm 
and  some  synaptic  processes  show  very  little  similarity.  For  those  features  which 
happen to be similar in these systems, I would be puzzled to show what Löweinheim-
Skolem-theorem is to do with. 
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What, then, does belong to mathematics?
A formal system is nothing more than axioms and rules, given as particular symbols, 
after all particular arrays of ink on a particular sheet. As it is a physical system, it must 
have some kind of behaviour as, for instance, the solar system has, in which one can 
observe some regularities. What kind of “behaviour” of this “system” can be identified 
by an observer not contaminated with platonic views from her schoolgirlhood – say, an 
alien? There is no such behaviour, unless one does not mean the  prima facie physical 
properties of the paper and the ink, which is probably not what the phyisicalist is up to. 
Because it must be seen, nothing mathematical follows from these physical properties.
For the strings of symbols to work as mathematics, the ink appearances must be 
realized as tokens. Thus, they must be realized by someone. But at this point we must 
postulate the inter-subjective existence of symbol types. Without recognising the types 
the given tokens belong to,  one can identify exactly  as many “systems” on an ink-
marked sheet of paper as in a handful of ashes poured on the table.
The first or the last? (If at all…)
Taking a glance at the history of mathematics it can be clearly seen, that philosophy and 
mathematics  have  always  been  living  close,  if  you  like,  in  a  kind  of  symbiotic 
relationship.  Also true, however, that the assessment of this relationship is quite far 
from  being  unanimous.  Some  scientists  assert  the  primality  of  philosophical 
considerations,  claiming  for  clear  philosophical  foundations  before  beginning  with 
mathematics.  Errett  Bishop,  the  father  of  constructive  analysis  was  seemingly 
unsatisfied with the practice of his contemporary mathematician fellows:xx
There  is  a  crisis  in  contemporary  mathematics.  And  anybody  who  has  not 
noticed  it  is  being  wilfully  blind.  The  crisis  is  due  to  our  neglect  of 
philosophical issues.
xx  Bishop (1975); recited in Shapiro (2000), p. 23.
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But  many maintain  that  philosophy has  no legitimacy to  lay  down different 
norms for mathematics. As David Lewis writes:xxi
How would you like to go and tell the mathematicians that they must change 
their ways […]? Will you tell them, with a straight face, to follow philosophical  
argument wherever it  leads? [...]  [W]ill  you boast  of philosophy's  [...]  great 
discoveries: That motion is impossible [...], that it is unthinkable that anything 
exists outside the mind, that time is unreal, that no theory has ever been made at 
all probable by evidence [...]? Not me!
As often, the truth lies somewhere in the middle. Philosophy should and would 
not in itself determine the right terms for scientific practice and methodology. But it has 
the  right  to  make  critical  observations  on  the  methodologies  of  sciences  or  even 
normative  recommendations.  Let  me give  now an  example  outside  of  mathematics. 
Despite  the  fact  that  it  is  quite  illegitimate  to  assume  causal  connection  between 
phenomena in statistical correlation, many sociologists do assume causal connection in 
those cases. (Not to mention policy-makers.) I think it is quite right to tell them they are 
wrong. On the other hand, they have the right not to change their well-tried ways with 
heavy traffic. Similarly, it is equally right to draw the mathematician’s attention to the 
awkward consequences of the Axiom of Choice every now and then…
The  physicalist  view,  as  Szabó  (2010)  makes  it  clear,  is  an  approach  to 
mathematics following the  philosophy-first  principle (as opposed to  the  philosophy-
last-if-at-all principle).xxii As such, similarly to the intuitionist program, it prescribes 
for mathematics what it should be. Do not be misguided by the fact, that it does it in a  
disguise of description. A description so far from the mathematics comprehended by 
common sense can be suspected to be a normative manifestation. 
xxi Lewis (1993); recited in Shapiro (2000), p. 30.
xxii A classification of Shapiro (2000).
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But the position of physicalism is much worse than that of intuitionism. The 
latter claims for serious methodological restrictions, and finds devoted followers among 
the practicing mathematicians – while, of course, the majority adheres to the “Cantorian 
paradise”.xxiii At the same time the physicalist, in aiming to show what mathematics 
really is, jettisons almost everything – including the whole methodology. For, according 
to the view, mathematical systems are nothing more than physical systems; there is no a 
priory  knowledge;  deduction  is  a  special  kind  of  induction;  our  only  source  of 
knowledge is empirical observation. And, to be sure, physics has its own methodology – 
why would another be needed? 
Maybe  the  mathematician  should  be  grateful  to  be  so  relieved  from  the 
methodological burden, but I have doubts about it. The situations is rather this: in trying 
to get rid of the all of the “verbal decoration” surrounding mathematics, the physicalist,  
it seems to me, gets rid of mathematics itself. Following him, the mathematician would 
be exiled not from the Cantorian but from the mathematical paradise.
xxiii See: Hilbert (1926).
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